On February 12th, United Europe in partnership with the European Forum Alpbach and Sovereign Europe Forum organised an official side event at this year’s Munich Security Conference at Hotel Bayerischer Hof.
Günther H. Oettinger, former Commissioner and President of United Europe, Jose Manuel Duaro Barroso, former President of the European Commission, and Othmar Karas, former Vice President European Parliament and President of European Forum Alpbach, opened the discussion with a short keynote followed by a panel with Andrius Kubilius, EU Commissioner for Space and Defense, Hans-Werner Sinn, former President of ifo Institut, Klaus Welle, Chairman Academic Council Wilfrid Martens Centre European Studies and Moritz Schularick, President of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. The discussion was moderated by Gabor Steingart, Founder and Publisher of The Pioneer.
What follows is not a transcript. It is an account of themes, tensions, and insights — drawn from a conversation under Chatham House Rules:
The Americans are Europeanizing NATO, whether we like it or not!
For decades, Europe has spoken the language of strategic sovereignty while practicing strategic dependency. We built a union of laws, markets, and currency, yet when it comes to defense – the most elemental function of sovereignty – we retreat into national reflexes. We cling to 27 defense establishments as if fragmentation were a virtue. It is not. It is Europe’s vulnerability.
History may record an irony: that the United States, through impatience and shifting priorities, is forcing Europe to do what it has long postponed. By demanding more burden-sharing, by signaling that American attention is no longer centered on Europe, Washington is, in effect, Europeanizing NATO. Whether we like it or not.
The real obstacle is not institutional. It is psychological.
We continue to treat defense spending as a national accounting exercise rather than a collective strategic investment. Yet spending at the national level will weaken us if it merely
duplicates capabilities across borders. Europe does not lack money; it lacks integration. We spend substantial sums, but the result is too little readiness, too little interoperability, and too little scale.
Would the United States be stronger if it had 51 separate state armies? Would its institutions be more effective if every governor negotiated troop deployments independently? The question answers itself. And yet that is precisely the model that persists in Europe.
If we are serious about security, we must think and act as a union.
That means more incremental coordination. It means building European defense capabilities – shared procurement, integrated command structures, and common industrial policy. The European Union must provide the framework for industrial capacity and regulatory coherence — as the Draghi report makes abundantly clear. What it lacks is not economic weight, but the political will to translate that weight into execution and credibility.
We should be prepared to spend 5 to 8 percent of GDP on defense – but spent wisely, jointly and strategically. Not as 27 parallel efforts, but as one.
What are we waiting for?
Public opinion is shifting. Europeans increasingly understand that security cannot be outsourced indefinitely. In times of crisis, the first necessity is intellectual mobilization. We must accept that Europe’s defense is Europe’s responsibility. Blaming the Americans for their changing priorities is easier than confronting our own hesitation. But it is also self-defeating.
The fragmentation problem is real. Our defense industries remain divided. Our procurement cycles are slow. Our technological investments lags behind both the United States and China. Last year, the United States conducted roughly 200 space launches; Europe managed only a handful. The gap is obvious!
Closing it requires two timelines: in the short term, we must dramatically increase production capacity: ammunition, air defense systems, drones, transport, cyber capabilities. In the long term, we must invest massively in advanced technologies – space, artificial intelligence, secure communications, next-generation manufacturing. Competitiveness and defense are not separate domains; they are two sides of the same coin. A continent that cannot innovate cannot defend itself.
Is a common European defense realistic?
Skeptics point to the difficulty of achieving consensus among member states. They are right. Europe is not known for swift agreement. But defense is not a policy area that can
wait. In an emergency, who answers the call? Who decides? Who commands?
Article 5 today does not mean what it meant five years ago. Strategic realities have shifted. The assumption that Europe will always come first in American calculations is no longer safe. And the uncomfortable truth is this: the fight, if it comes, must be fought primarily by Europeans.
We therefore need more than coordination. We need a standing European Rapid Reaction Force – equipped trained and ready to deploy. We need shared assets and common capabilities. We need a European Security Council composed of those countries willing and able to contribute seriously to collective defense, capable of making decisions when needed.
Managing 15 or 25 separate armies competitively is impossible. Bringing them together is difficult – but necessary. The creation of the euro once seemed politically unthinkable. Yet Europe took that leap because the alternative was decline. We now stand before a similarly historic choice.
The reality is stark: we spend a great deal, but our spending does not translate into capability. Our material readiness remains uneven. Our industrial base is insufficiently scaled. Our command structures are fragmented. This is not a matter of resources; it is a matter of maturity.
Europe needs to grow up.
That means accepting that sovereignty in the 21st century is exercised through shared institutions, not guarded behind national fences. Security is indivisible and understanding that the era of comfortable dependance has ended.
The Americans are Europeanizing NATO. They are telling us, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, that the future of Europe’s defense lies in Europe’s hands. The question is: are we ready?
By Dyria Sigrid Alloussi, Program Director at United Europe e.V.